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Tort Law. Rock v. State, 681 A.2d 901 (R.I. 1996). Foreseeability
of harm is determined by the totality of the circumstances and,
while foreseeability is a factor to be considered when evaluating
whether a duty of care exists, it does not, in and of itself, give rise
to a duty.
In an action for wrongful death, as in any negligence action,
the threshold question is whether a duty runs from the defendant
to the plaintiff. In Rock v. State, I the Rhode Island Supreme Court
addressed whether a private vocational school, contracting with
the Rhode Island Training School2 to accept a juvenile inmate as
part of a community based learning program, owed a duty of care3
to persons living within the vicinity of the school. 4 In Rock, a di-
vided court refused to impose liability because, unlike the training
school, the private school was a non-custodial facility,5 it did not
receive full disclosure regarding the inmate's violent history,6 and
finally, because of the laws governing confidentiality of juvenile
records, even an independent investigation of Jewett's background
by the school would have been futile. 7
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In 1990, while still a minor, Robert Jewett (Jewett) was serv-
ing a sentence at the Rhode Island training school for first degree
sexual assault of a twelve year old girl.8 While at the school, Jew-
ett participated in an experimental, community-placement educa-
tional program at a private vocational school, Motoring Technical
1. 681 A.2d 901 (R.I. 1996).
2. R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-56-33 (1956). 'The department of corrections shall
maintain a school to be known as the training school for youth for the detention of
children by order of the family court and for the confinement, instruction, and ref-
ormation of children found delinquent or wayward by the family court." Id.
3. The duty at issue here is a duty to monitor the student, not a duty to warn
the community that he was attending this community-based school. Rock, 681
A.2d at 901.
4. Id
5. Id at 902. "[Motoring Technical Services, Inc.] is not a custodial or a penal
facility. It is a vocational school open to the public and therefore under no obliga-
tion to maintain continuous supervision of the students." Id. at 903 (citing
Beauchene v. Synanon Foundation, Inc., 88 Cal. App. 3d 342 (1979)).
6. Id at 901.
7. Id at 903.
8. Id at 902.
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Services, Inc. (Motoring).9 During a morning break from classes on
January 8, 1990, Jewett left the school premises, broke into the
Rock household, and sexually assaulted and murdered young
Kimberly Rock.' 0 On October 30, 1991, Jewett pled guilty to her
murder, and was sentenced to life in prison."
Kimberly Rock's parents, plaintiffs in this action, filed a
wrongful death action against numerous defendants, including
Motoring.12 The plaintiffs alleged that Motoring "owed a duty of
care" to the community, which included an obligation to monitor
Jewett while he was in their program. 13 In response, Motoring
filed a motion for summary judgment.14 Granting the motion, the
trial judge concluded that Motoring did not owe the plaintiffs a
duty.15 That issue was appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme
Court.
BACKGROUND
In order to prove a case of wrongful death, the four elements of
negligence must first be met.16 Recovery in negligence requires
proof of: (1) a duty, or obligation recognized by law, for the protec-
tion of others against unreasonable risks; (2) a breach of that duty,
defined as a failure to conform to the prescribed standard of care;
(3) a reasonably close causal connection between the conduct and
the resulting injury (proximate cause); and (4) actual loss or dam-
age.17 The only significant difference between traditional negli-
gence actions and wrongful death claims is the last element of
damages.' 8 Whereas in negligent actions it is the injured party
seeking damages, in wrongful death claims, it is the survivors who









16. Joseph W. Glannon, The Law of Torts 287 (1995).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 288.
19. Id.
SURVEY SECTION
While Rhode Island's Supreme Court has avoided "definitively
committ[ing] itself" to any particular analytical approach in deter-
mining the existence of a duty,20 in Banks v. Bowen's Landing,2 '
the court held that the existence of a duty is a question for the
court and not the jury.22 In Banks, the court stated that it would
consider "the foreseeability of harm... the degree of certainty that
the plaintiff [was injured],... the [causal] connection between the
defendant's conduct and the injury, . . . the policy of preventing
future harm, and.., the extent of the burden to the defendant and
the consequences to the community for imposing a duty."2 3 Addi-
tionally, the court has concluded that while "foreseeability" is a
factor to be considered when determining whether a duty exists,
2 4
it "does not, in and of itself, give rise to a duty."2 5 Finally, consid-
eration regarding the existence of a duty must reflect interests of
"public policy, as well as notions of fairness."26
ANALYsIs AND HOLDING
In Rock, Motoring claimed that the wrongful death action
failed for lack of evidence establishing existence of the first ele-
ment, duty.27 The majority acknowledged the elusiveness of a
workable test to determine whether a duty of care exists.28 None-
theless, it outlined the principles guiding its decision.
In reaching its conclusion, the majority concentrated on the
nature of Motoring as a vocational school open to the public. 2 9 As
such, its intended role was neither "jailor nor security agency,"30
rather it was education. The majority notes that it is the training
facility's responsibility to determine which residents are capable of
leaving the grounds without posing a danger to others.31 This re-
20. D'Ambra v. United States, 338 A.2d 527 (R.I. 1975).
21. 522 A.2d 1222 (R.I. 1987).
22. Id. at 1224.
23. Id. at 1225.
24. Id. at 1224-25; Builder's Specialty Co. v. Goulet, 639 A.2d 59, 60 (RI.
1994).
25. Marchetti v. Parsons, 638 A.2d 1047, 1051 (R.I. 1994); D'Ambra v. United
States, 338 A.2d 527, 528 (LI. 1975).
26. Ferreira v. Strack, 636 A.2d 682, 685 (R.I. 1994).
27. Rock v. State, 681 A-2d 901, 902 (RI. 1996).
28. Id. at 903.
29. Id.
30. Id-
31. Id. at 904.
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sponsibility stems largely from the custodial relationship between
training school authorities and their charges. This element is no-
ticeably absent from the relationship Motoring and other educa-
tional facilities have with their pupils.
32
In reviewing decisions of other jurisdictions, the court cited
both a California case involving what duty, if any, a drug rehabili-
tation center had to the general public3 3 and a Vermont case in-
volving whether a university had a legal duty to control the
criminal acts of its students.3 4 In both cases, the courts held that
the institution did not have a legal duty. As in Rock, a central ele-
ment in the courts' analysis was that of control.
While Motoring's function as a vocational school was funda-
mental to the court's analysis, the State's failure to provide reason-
able notice proved dispositive. The court distinguished a school,
"open to the public," from custodial and penal facilities, and indi-
cated that as a vocational school Motoring was "under no obliga-
tion to maintain continuous supervision of its students."3 5
The court's analysis continued to demonstrate that Motoring
had not received sufficient notice of the threat posed by Jewett.36
Neither Robert Jewett nor the agents for the training school dis-
closed Jewett's adjudication for first degree sexual assault.37 Mo-
toring was told simply that Jewett was incarcerated for breaking
and entering.38 In addition, "the state portrayed Jewett as a
highly motivated individual and indicated that he was among 'the
best kids allowed to utilize this opportunity in terms of working off
grounds.' "39 Motoring was told that Jewett was to be treated "like
any other student."40 Indeed, as the majority points out, the state
32. 1d.
33. Id.; see also Beauchene v. Synanon Foundation, Inc., 88 Cal. App. 3d 342
(1979) (An escapee from the facility shot a member of the public, and the California
court refused to find liability.).
34. Smith v. Day, 538 A.2d 157 (Vt. 1987).
35. Rock, 681 k2d at 903.
36. Id. at 902-03. The majority dismissed the dissents contention that Motor-
ing was effectively provided with notice, in part, because he was driven to and from
Motoring's facilities in a state-owned van. The majority found this fact to be "ut-
terly without significance," observing, "[a)ny training school resident would be so
transported." Id.





represented Jewett as among "the best kids [who were] allowed to
utilize [the opportunity of] working off grounds,"4 1 and further in-
formed Motoring that Jewett had been allowed to spend weekends
away from the training school with one supervising adult. The ma-
jority determined that the cumulative effect of details provided to
Motoring regarding Jewett, combined with information withheld
in accordance with a statute governing confidentiality of juvenile
records,42 led to the conclusion that Jewett's actions were not
foreseeable. 43
This statutory provision was a significant factor resulting in
the division of the court. Whereas the majority read section 42-72-
87 of the Rhode Island General Laws to require juvenile records in
this case to remain confidential, not satisfying any of the excep-
tions listed in subsection (b),44 the dissent argued that the statute
clearly provides an exception applicable to the facts of this case.45
The training school entered into this agreement with the voca-
tional facility for the purpose of educating Jewett. According to the
dissent, "the state was prepared to provide Motoring with
'whatever information was necessary to secure the placement.'" 48
Additionally, the dissent postulates that even if Motoring was un-
able to acquire information about Jewett's convictions and juvenile
history, there was enough evidence for it to know that Jewett
posed a risk to the community and therefore required close
monitoring.47
The dissent also placed weight on Jewett's application to en-
roll in Motoring's program.48 Notice that Jewett was dangerous,
according to the dissent, was provided when, on his application,
Jewett reported convictions of an "unspecified number of breaking
and entering offenses."49 Acknowledging that the application did
41. Id.
42. LI. Gen. Laws § 42-72-8(a) (1956). "Any records of the department [of
children, youth, and families] pertaining to children... shall be confidential and
only disclosed as provided by law." Id
43. Rock, 681 A.2d at 904.
44. LI. Gen. Laws § 42-72-8(b) (1956). "Records may be disclosed when neces-
sary- to individuals, or public or private agencies engaged in.. . education of the
person under the supervision of the department... ." Id.
45. Rock, 681 A.2d at 911 (Flanders & Lederberg, JJ., dissenting).
46. Id
47. Id.
48. Id. at 909-11.
49. Id. at 906.
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not provide a complete rendition of Jewett's offenses, 50 the dissent
found that the information provided on the application was suffi-
cient to alert Motoring that this student "was not just any juvenile
delinquent; rather he was a rapist and an attempted murderer of a
twelve-year old girl."5 ' The majority points out, however, that
when Motoring asked Jewett the reasons for his incarceration, he
disclosed only that he had been confined for a breaking and enter-
ing charge.52 Neither the rape nor the attempted murder was ever
disclosed to Motoring by either Jewett or the state.5 3 Both the ma-
jority and the dissent find support in Restatement (Second) Torts
section 319, ("[olne who takes charge of a third person whom he
knows or should know to be likely to cause bodily harm to others if
not controlled is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control
the third person to prevent him from doing such harm.") The ma-
jority emphasizes cognizance, whereas the dissent emphasizes
control.
CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, the majority responds only to a relatively mi-
nor point made by the dissent regarding Jewett's transportation to
and from Motoring. Then the Court expresses its own fears that if
liability extends to Motoring, it would portend the demise of pro-
grams such as work release.' 4 Never does the majority address the
dissenting justices' contention that Motoring was provided with
statutory mechanisms to learn of Jewett's actual criminal history.
The majority's conclusion that no duty of care existed is premised
only in part on the representations made by the state and Jewett
himself. The other pillar supporting the majority's position is reli-
ance on the statutory prohibition concerning disclosure of juvenile
records. But dissenting Justice Flanders appears to topple that
pillar, noting the exception to the rule, found in section 42-72-
8(b)(1) which permits disclosure "when necessary" to those "indi-
viduals, or public or private agencies engaged in... [the] education
50. Id
51. Id
52. Id. at 904.
53. Id. at 903. Regardless of Motoring's alleged lack of knowledge, the dissent
argues that liability attached anyway when Motoring "took charge" of Jewett, re-
ceiving him into the vocational program each day. Id. at 909 (Flanders &
Lederberg, JJ., dissenting).
54. Id. at 905.
SURVEY SECTION
of the person under the supervision" of the Department of Chil-
dren, Youth and Families.5 5 Finding that the plaintiffs did not es-
tablish a duty owed by Motoring, the majority asserted that
plaintiffs' reliance on the Restatement (Second) Torts was mis-
placed.56 To the contrary, if Justice Flanders's understanding of
Rhode Island General Laws section 42-72-8(b) is correct, is not Mo-
toring a party who, at the very least, "should have known" the po-
tential threat posed by Robert Jewett? That question is never
answered by the majority.
John A. Leidecker, Jr.
55. Id, at 911.
56. Id. at 904 m2.
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